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Can David Really Beat Goliath? A Look into the Anti-Competitive
Restrictions of Apple Inc. and Google, LLC
Emily Feeley

Introduction
Apple Inc. (“Apple”) and Google, LLC (“Google”) quickly become titans of e-commerce
and have revolutionized the digital market.1 They set the standards and other companies strive to
compete, or even just to keep up. This article first looks at the digital marketplaces of the Apple
App Store and Google Play Store.2 Both the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store focus
on selling applications (“app” or “apps”) that are downloadable onto smartphones. These apps
are intangible but are often used to purchase both intangible and tangible goods. Presently, Apple
is surrounded by controversy regarding whether the commission rates it receives from the
developers who choose to place their apps on the Apple App Store are reasonable, or if the rates
create a monopoly.34 Google Play Store has escaped the public scandal and litigation for now,
but its policies are roughly the same as those that affect the developers for Apple apps.5 This
article seeks to analyze the alleged monopolization of Apple and Google for their respective
digital markets, the controversy surrounding their present policies, the publics opinion, and the
possible outcomes of government intervention within these volatile markets.

1

This article will focus exclusively on the alleged monopolization of the app market that is present on smartphones
and other various digital devices created by these technology giants.
2
The Google App Store on Android devices will be referred to as “Google Play Store.”
3
The App developer is the entity that created the app, and is often the entity responsible for updating and
maintaining the app. Often, the developer is the entity that owns the app, but as is common with goods, these
ownership rights can be transferred to another entity. This article will focus on developers who own their apps,
and will not delve into the issue of app ownership by a non-developer.
4
Epic Games, #freefornite (last accessed Oct. 27, 2020); https://www.epicgames.com/fortnite/enUS/news/freefortnite.
5
Id.
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Apple App Store and Google Play Store
Americans are known for their love of smartphones, and such devices have become
almost essential in everyday life. In the United States, approximately 96% of Americans own a
cellphone of some kind, 81% of which are smartphones.6 Factoring in that nearly 75% of
Americans own a desktop computer or laptop device, most Americans have had some sort of
interaction with the apps on smart devices.7 In the United States alone, approximately 52.4% of
smartphone users use Apple iOS devices and approximately 47% use Google Android devices.8
This makes the Apple App Store and Google Play Store the predominant digital marketplaces in
the United States.
Commission Rates for the Apple App Store and Google Play Store
Apple’s commission rates depend on how the company categorizes the app.9 This
categorization is based on whether there are internal advertisements in-app, whether the user
must subscribe or pay upfront to purchase the app, and whether the app is a reader.10 App Store
Review Guidelines 3.1 concerns payments and goes into detail about the classification of apps,
when Apple will take a commission, and the various exceptions for when Apple will not take a
commission such as when the app is free or when the app is merely a reader app.11 12 Apple also

6

Pew Research Center, Mobile Fact Sheet, Pew Research Center: Internet & Technology (June 12, 2019);
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/.
7
Id.
8
S. O’Dea, U.S. smartphone subscriber share by operating platform 2012-2020, by month, Statista:
Telecommunications (Aug. 17, 2020);
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-by-smartphone-platforms-in-the-united-states/.
9
Apple, App Store Principles and Practices https://www.apple.com/ios/app-store/principles-practices/ (last visited
Sept. 21, 2020).
10
Id.
11
Id. A reader app is when “users exclusively purchase or subscribe to content outside the app, but enjoy access to
that content inside the app on their Apple devices.”
12
Apple, App Store Review Guidelines, Apple Developer, https://developer.apple.com/appstore/review/guidelines/#payments (last updated Sept. 11, 2020).
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supplies a list of dos and don’ts for more unique apps such as insurance apps, fundraising apps,
and apps for stock trades.13 Regardless of these different classifications, only in-app purchases
(“IAP”) or upfront purchases of apps trigger a 30% commission charge.14 As one individual
aptly said on the Apple Developer Forums, “[i]f what you are selling is performed by code
within the app then you must use IAP.”15 For a better understanding of the commission rates
based on the classification of the App, see the following chart.

Apple’s Commission Rates by Classification
Apple’s Commission Rates
Free
0%
Free with
0%
Advertising
Developer earns revenue from in-app
advertisements
Free with in-app
30% of In-App Purchases
Purchase
Developer earns based on in-app purchases
Free with physical 0%
goods and services Developer earns based on the sale of physical
goods or services
Free with
30% for First Year & 15% for Every Year
Subscription
After
Developers earn money from in-app subscriptions
Paid
30%
Developers earn money by charging up-front for
the app
Reader
0%
Purchases are made outside the app and enjoyed
in-app
Cross-Platform
0% or 30%
Apple only earns a commission from purchases
made in-app
The data for this chart is directly from Apple’s website.16

Example Apps
Wikipedia, Geico
Instagram, Twitter

Candy Crush Saga,
Skype
Amazon, Lyft,
Target
Pandora, Hulu

Facetune, Heads
Up!
Spotify, Amazon
Kindle, Netflix
Hulu, Microsoft
Word, Dropbox

13

Id.
Id.
15
PBK, Will Apple charge me 30% commission?, Apple Developer Forums (last visited Sept. 21, 2020);
https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/103195.
16
Apple, App Store Principles and Practices https://www.apple.com/ios/app-store/principles-practices/ (last visited
Sept. 21, 2020).
14
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Developers with subscribing users, such as Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix”) or Hulu, have the
choice between classification as a reader app or allowing for in-app purchases of the necessary
subscription.17 Netflix made news in 2018 when the company decided it would no longer allow
subscriptions through the Apple App Store.18 As a result, Apple may have lost up to $256 million
in profits according to a Sensor Tower study.19 The study bases its calculations on data it
complied suggesting that Netflix grossed $853 million from in-app subscriptions in 2018.20 The
$256 million number is an estimation based on a 30% commission being collected by Apple for
the first year of the subscription and a 15% commission on the in-app subscription for every year
after.21 While the accuracy of the Sensor Tower study may be up for debate, it is still important
to note that Apple could have lost $256 million in revenue in one year because it shows that the
30% commission is clearly significant. The choice of developers to allow users to make
subscriptions in-app is certainly a costly one as the 30% commission rate has proven to be quite
substantial. Consider the following two questions: (1) are users more inclined to purchase
subscriptions in-app, and (2) would the removal of the in-app subscription result in fewer users?
Companies that are thinking about either removing or adding in-app subscriptions must think
about these questions carefully. It is doubtful that the removal of in-app subscriptions resulted in
many users opting out of a Netflix subscription altogether. However, smaller, lesser-known apps
may very well be better off retaining these in-app subscriptions to reach a larger market.

17

Id.
The Verge, Netflix stops offering in-app subscriptions for new and returning customers on iOS,
https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/28/18159373/netflix-in-app-subscriptions-iphone-ipad-ios-apple (last
accessed Oct. 27, 2020).
19
Sarah Perez, Netflix stops paying the ‘Apple tax’ on its $853M in annual iOS revenue, Tech Crunch (Dec. 31,
2018); https://techcrunch.com (search “Netflix stops paying the ‘Apple tax’ on its $853M in annual iOS revenue”
and select top result).
20
Id.
21
Apple, App Store Principles and Practices (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
18
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Google Play Store has a similar commission structure to the Apple App Store, charging
30% commission for apps and in-app digital purchases.22 Google Play Store also reduces in-app
subscriptions to 15% commission after the first year and provides further guidance on what does
and does not count towards the user’s first paid year.23 Google Play Store’s guidelines of what is
an in-app purchase are similar to Apple’s and have included protections for consumers in an
effort to not allow the developers to mislead consumers.24
Apple App Store and Google Play Store both charge an additional expense for a
developer account before developers can place an app on their operating systems.25 Apple
charges a $99 annual fee for the Apple Developer Program and a $299 annual fee for the
enterprise version.26 Google Play Store charges a one-time $25 registration fee for a developer
account.27 These developer accounts allow the developers to have access to resources that are not
available to regular users and to receive support for the operating software.28 Since the costs that
the developers pay for the developer accounts are either annual or one-time rather than
commission, they are outside the scope of this article.29

22

Google, Service Fees, Google: Play Console Help, https://support.google.com/googleplay/androiddeveloper/answer/112622 (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
23
Id.
24
Google, Payments, Google: Play Console Help, https://support.google.com/googleplay/androiddeveloper/answer/9858738 (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
25
See Apple, Purchase and Activation, Apple Developer Support, https://developer.apple.com/support/purchaseactivation/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2020); Google, How to use the Play Console, Play Console Help,
https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6112435?hl=en (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
26
Apple, Purchase and Activation, Apple Developer Support, https://developer.apple.com/support/purchaseactivation/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
27
Google, How to use the Play Console, Play Console Help, https://support.google.com/googleplay/androiddeveloper/answer/6112435?hl=en (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
28
Id.; Apple, App Store Principles and Practices (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
29
Id.
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Do Apple Store and Google Play Charge More Than Other Market Places?
Apple has, seemingly, responded to criticism of its commission rates by arguing that its
rates are comparable to those of other digital markets.30 Apple has supported a July 2020 study
that reiterates this point.31 The study, “Apple’s App Store and Other Digital Marketplaces: A
Comparison of Commission Rates,” focuses specifically on the purchase of non-physical goods
through the Apple App Store and compares Apple’s commission rates to other major players
such as Google Play Store, Microsoft Store, Amazon Appstore, and Samsung Galaxy Store.32
The study does not find Apple App Store’s commission rates to be unusual for the market since
numerous other app distribution marketplaces also use 30% commission rates.33
The study further looks into what the comparative rate is in other countries. The study
found that in countries where there is no singular digital marketplace, the commission rates are
often much higher.34 China is a perfect example of this trend because the country does not have
Google Play Store as a digital marketplace for Android phones.35 As a result, numerous Android
app stores were created to fill the void such as Huawei AppGallery, OPPO Software Store, Vivo
App Store, MyApp, and China Mobile’s MM Store.36 These app stores often charge a
commission fee of 50% or more.37

30

See Analysis Group, Apple’s App Store and Other Digital Marketplaces: A Comparison of Commission Rates,
Analysis Group (July 22, 2020),
https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalassets/insights/publishing/apples_app_store_and_other_digital_marketpla
ces_a_comparison_of_commission_rates.pdf, at 5.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 5.
33
Id. at 2.
34
See Id. at A-5.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 6.
37
Id.
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The study, however, does not ask the right questions. The study should have asked, or at
least addressed, whether the Apple App Store’s 30% commission rate is too high or unusual and
whether the prevention of alternative means to obtain apps on one’s device is a monopoly.
Do Digital Marketplaces Have a Monopoly?
Due to differences in the operating software, Google Play Store is not available on iOS
devices, and Apple App Store is not downloadable on Android devices.38 Apps that are
compatible with one operating system cannot easily or cheaply transfer to another operating
system. Different operating systems involve different codes, development tools, platforms,
device fragmentation, and simulators.39 The operating system a developer decides to place their
app on first generally is based on the developer’s knowledge of the operating system and which
platform appeals more to their market.40 Although, regardless of which platform a developer
chooses, the developer will likely end up paying a 30% commission rate for in-app purchases.41
Whether the 30% commission rate is too high for the market is unclear and remains up
for debate. Developers do not have alternative means to market their products on Apple devices
or Android devices because there is not a traditional open market for apps. Developers do not
have another digital marketplace that they can go to if they feel that the commission rates are too
high or are unreasonable.

38

Business Insider, How to get Google Play on your iPhone, and use it to download movies, music, and more,
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-get-google-play-on-iphone (last visited October 27, 2020).
39
Various, Is it easier to develop an app/game for iOS or for Android?, Quora, https://www.quora.com/Is-it-easierto-develop-an-app-game-for-iOS-or-for-Android (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
40
BuildFire, IOS vs Android: Which Should You Build Your Mobile App on First, BuildFire, https://buildfire.com/iosandroid-which-to-develop-on-first/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2020). The referenced article is a biased, but interesting,
comparison for which operating system a game should be built on first.
41
Analysis Group, Apple’s App Store and Other Digital Marketplaces: A Comparison of Commission Rates, Analysis
Group (July 22, 2020).
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Phone manufacturers could simply make a basic phone that performs phone calls and text
messages over a cellular network. The makers of these devices have no obligation to allow other
developers on their apps. Technological advancements have allowed for the creation of a new
marketplace with endless possibilities and, similar to the early days in the wild west, some
questions must be answered to set order. The question that must now be answered is whether or
not a singular digital marketplace is a monopoly.
Litigation Regarding Anti-Competition
In the past ten years, there have been numerous legal actions against Apple concerning its
alleged monopolization of the app market.42 These allegations involve Apple’s involvement in
iBookstore, iTunes, and the Apple App Store.43 Although iBookstore and iTunes are not within
the Apple App Store, such litigation illustrates Apple’s history of monopolizing the market and
Apple’s consequences for these actions.
The first sort of anti-trust litigation that Apple was involved in revolved around the
iTunes store.44 iTunes was Apple’s original digital marketplace for music on its devices and still
exists as a digital marketplace for purchases of music singles and albums.45 Recently, iTunes has
fallen out of popularity with the younger generations in favor of Apple Music, a subscription
service that allows users to listen and download unlimited music to which Apple has license

42

See generally United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015); Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 75
F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
43
Id.
44
In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, 796 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1139 (N.D.Cal.2011).
45
Apple, What happened to iTunes?, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210200 (last accessed Oct. 27, 2020).
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agreements.46 However, prior to the popularization of Apple Music, Spotify, and other music
apps, iTunes was the primary destination to purchase digital music.
In 2006, Charoensak v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 05–00037 JW, and Tucker v. Apple
Computer, Inc. were consolidated to form In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., a putative
class action against Apple alleging that Apple violated § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, among
other acts and state laws.47 In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig. was brought after Apple
created an update to iTunes that redesigned FairPlay to prevent other third-party applications
from placing music onto the iPod.48 FairPlay is an encryption system that Apple created, and it
protects the copyrighted songs available on iTunes.49 The plaintiffs alleged that “Apple made
technological modifications to its products for the express purpose of maintaining monopoly
power.”50 Apple argued that it implemented the update to prevent third-party applications from
corrupting the iPod because such applications could modify the internal database and prevent the
addition of foreign files to the operating system.51 Apple further contended that the update
worked only by allowing iTunes to write on the iPods’ internal database.52
Apple’s refusal to license FairPlay to RealNetworks, one of their direct competitors, is
not anticompetitive conduct.53 The court held that there is not a duty to aid one’s competitors
unless there has been a prior course of dealing.54 As the plaintiffs could not prove that there had

46

Id.; See Apple, Listen to music and more in the Apple Music app, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204951
(last accessed Oct. 27, 2020).
47
The two combined cases that form this case are Charoensak v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 05–00037 JW, and
Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. C 06–04457 JW. In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137,
1140 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1141.
51
Id. at 1146.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1144-1145.
54
Id. at 1145.
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been a prior course of dealing between Apple and RealNetworks due to Apple’s adamant refusal
to license its intellectual property, there is no violation of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.55
Following the court’s ruling that Apple did not have to license FairPlay to others such as
RealNetworks, other companies have shifted the focus of litigation to other apps of Apple that
were also deemed by their competitors to have been monopolistic such as the iBookstore.56 Both
United States v. Apple, Inc. and In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig. concerns apps that
directly compete with apps developed by Apple.57 These cases are likely why Apple lists
competing apps available on the App Store if a user does not wish to use an Apple App, such as
Spotify instead of Apple Music, or Amazon Kindle instead of Books 58
In 2012, the United States Department of Justice, in collaboration with thirty-three states
and territories, brought legal action against Apple and several book publishers concerning
whether there was a conspiracy to raise, fix, and stabilize retail prices for digital books on the
iBookstore app.59 Specifically, they alleged a violation of §1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and
state antitrust laws.60 This action followed the release and successes of the iPad.61 Due to the
success of the Amazon Kindle, Apple sought to create a marketplace on its operating system for
digital books and at the time of this litigation it was known as iBookstore.62 The iPad, an
innovative and compact device with the power of a computer, was the perfect device for the

55

Id.
See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015).
57
Id.; In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
58
Apple, App Store Principles and Practices, https://www.apple.com/ios/app-store/principles-practices/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2020).
59
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015).
60
Id.
61
The first-generation Apple iPad’s were initially released on April 3, 2010, while the second generation was
released in 2011. See AppleInsider, A brief history of the iPad, Apple's once and future tablet,
https://appleinsider.com/articles/18/04/03/a-brief-history-of-the-ipad-apples-once-and-future-tablet (last visited
Oct. 27, 2020).
62
iBookstore is now commonly known as “Books.”
56
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iBookstore. Furthermore, the iPad was similar to the Amazon Kindle in size and weight, making
it a strong competitor.63 Apple executives seized the release of the iPad and began negotiations
with the “Big Six” of the publishing world.64 Of the “Big Six” only five made arrangements with
Apple that were the source of this controversy (“Publisher Defendants”).65 The Publisher
Defendants had the authority to set the prices of their publications, with the prices of new
releases and New York Times Bestsellers not costing more than $19.99 and $14.99,
respectively.66 Despite the publishers’ ability to set the prices, the Publisher Defendants received
less from Apple than they did from Amazon for the purchase of eBooks.67 The Publisher
Defendants then sought to gain control over their pricing from Amazon and then raised the prices
of their eBooks within a few months.68
Apple and the Publisher Defendants committed a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.69 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Apple’s
agreements with the Publisher Defendants were a conspiracy to raise the price of eBooks, and
thus issued an injunction to prevent further price manipulation.70 Apple appealed the injunction,
but the Second Circuit affirmed the lower courts decision.71 The Second Circuit held the
injunction to be reasonable because the injunction only pertained to the Publisher Defendants’
agreements with Apple and used an interval-based system in which Apple was prevented from

63

Id. at 299.
The “Big Six” are more specifically: Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin, Random House, and Simon &
Schuster. They are commonly known to be the largest publishers in the United States. United States v. Apple, Inc.,
791 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 2015).
65
The five that participated are Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin, and Simon & Schuster. Id. at 296.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 297.
70
Id.
71
Id.
64
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agreeing to limit its pricing authority for “between 24 and 48 months depending on the Publisher
Defendant.”72 The court was deferential in this matter stating that “context is particularly
important,” and it disregarded the Department of Justice’s recommendation that there be a
restriction on all discounting between Apple and the Publisher Defendants for five years.73
United States v. Apple, Inc. was only resolved in 2015 and the consequence that Apple
and the Publisher Defendants received was relatively mild and focused.74 The injunction did not
restrict Apple’s agreements with other publishers or other developers, it only affected the
Publisher Defendants that participated in the price conspiracy. More importantly, the case set a
precedent for Apple’s involvement with anti-trust and anti-competition laws. Apple received a
slap on the wrist for its conspiracy to manipulate the price of eBooks, but this punishment is not
enough of a deterrence to prevent Apple from engaging in similar behavior in its other digital
marketplaces.
Epic Games and Spotify Challenge Apple Inc.
As of 2020, Epic Games, Inc. (“Epic Games”) and Spotify AB (“Spotify”) have decided
to continue the battle against Apple’s App Store policies. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc. is the
principal case against Apple in the United States, since Spotify filed its complaint against Apple
with the European Commission.75 What makes both of these cases interesting is that all three of
the companies are technologically sophisticated and have an avid fan base that they are utilizing

72

Id. at 337-338.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-CV-05640-YGR, 2020 WL 5073937 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2020); Frequently
Asked Questions, Time to Play Fair, https://www.timetoplayfair.com/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Oct.
12, 2020).
73
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to gain popular support. This section will discuss the allegations in both cases, where the cases
currently stand, public opinion, and the potential outcomes of these cases.
While many may not be familiar with Epic Games, it has cemented itself in the video game
market with its game Fortnite. Fortnite has surged to popularity with the younger generations as
it is free to download and can be played on most modern gaming devices.76 Epic Games makes a
profit from Fortnite solely from players purchasing additional features within the game and thus
does not rely on advertisements to boost revenues.77 It is no surprise that a game that profits
almost exclusively from IAP has come to the forefront of the battle against Apple concerning
Apple’s IAP commission rate. Not one to be satisfied with taking on just one giant of the
technological industry, Epic Games has extended its fight to the Google Play Store as well.78
To understand the litigation between Epic Games and Apple it is important to first
understand how Fortnite operates and how its related company, Epic Games International, S.a.r.l
(“Epic International”) operates. As previously mentioned, Fortnite is free to download and play.
The game is free to play for as long as the user desires, however, to get additional benefits within
the game, such as different skins for your playable character, the player will have to complete
various missions and challenges to unlock them. For players that don’t want to go through all the
effort of continually staying on top of the challenges and missions, there is the option of
purchasing “V-Bucks.”79 V-Bucks allow the player to get different benefits such as the Battle

76

Epic Games, FAQ, https://www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/faq (last accessed on Oct. 27, 2020).
The Fortnite game also has merchandise that it sells and profits from in both online and physical stores, but this
will not be discussed at length here as it does not pertain to the issue of Apple’s App Store policies.
78
The complaint has been made available by Epic Games. See Epic Games, #freefornite,
https://www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/news/freefortnite (last accessed Oct. 27, 2020).
79
Iain Wilson and Ford James, Fortnite Missions: What are they, how do they work, and how do you complete
them?, GamesRadar+ Guides (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.gamesradar.com/fortnite-missions/.
77
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Pass and other cosmetics for their playable character.80 Despite the game being free, a survey of
1,000 Fortnite players revealed that 68.8% of users spend money on in-game purchases and
found that the average user spends $84.37 on these purchases.81 While the survey is not a
particularly large survey, the results are quite telling about how willing the Fortnite players are to
spend money to get the additional benefits in the game. Even more telling, the survey found that
Fortnite was the first in-game purchase for 36.78% of those surveyed.82 Once a player has
purchased something on Fortnite, they can use it on any platform that their Fortnite account is
signed into.83 A platform is any device such as an Xbox or PlayStation that can play the game,
and often due to the operating system of these platforms play between them is incompatible.
Even if a user is playing the same game on the Xbox, they will not be able to play with their
friend on another platform such as PlayStation or use the same profile on multiple platforms. If
the game is designed to allow for cross-platform play, then users may play with others on
different platforms or use the same profile on other platforms they own. Another draw to Fortnite
is that users can play cross-platform; whereas most games presently on the market will not allow
users to play with users on other platforms or to retain the same profile on different platforms.84
However, for a player to be able to do cross-platform play, they must be on the same version of
the game.85 In addition to general updates being necessary for the game, Epic Games also

80

Fortnite V-Bucks: what they are, how much do they cost, and can you get free V-Bucks? PC Games,
https://www.pcgamesn.com/fortnite/fortnite-free-v-bucks-win-prices-buy (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
81
Mike Brown, The Finances of Fortnite: How Much Are People Spending on This Game?, Lendedu (June 26, 2018),
https://lendedu.com/blog/finances-of-fortnite/.
82
Id.
83
To do this the player must merge their Fortnite accounts. Most games will not allow users to do this. For those
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updates whenever there is a new “season” of the game, which is only available for a limited
time.86 The seasons change the gameplay and allow players to participate in new storylines,
themes, events, and customizations for their playable character.87
Epic International, a related company to Epic Games, hosts the Unreal Engine (among other
things).88 The Unreal Engine is a graphics engine that developers can use to create video games,
content for film and television, or architectural and automotive visualization.89 The Unreal
Engine has two basic licensing terms that its users can choose from. If the user wishes to create
something that will not produce a profit, then the software is free. If, however, the user wishes to
monetize what they create with the software, then there is a 5% royalty that is incurred when the
lifetime gross revenue from the product exceeds $1,000,000 USD.90 The Unreal Engine is used
by many developers of games for both apps and console games.91 Users of the Unreal Engine
vary from small developers to giants in the technology industry like Microsoft.92
On August 13, 2020, Epic Games allowed Fortnite players to make IAP for the Apple App
version of its product through methods other than the Apple Store, effectively preventing Apple
from receiving its usual 30% commission rate.93 Unsurprisingly, Apple responded immediately
and removed Fortnite from the App Store.94 Removing Fortnite from the Apple App Store
prevented any new download of the game and also prohibited any updates of the game to iOS
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devices that had installed Fortnite prior to its removal. Reacting just as quickly as Apple, Epic
Games filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California against Apple alleging violations of the Sherman Act, California's Cartwright Act, and
California's Unfair Competition Law relating to Apple's App Store policies.95 The Complaint
alleges a total of ten different counts against Apple.96 All of these allegations are related to the
30% commission rate that Apple’s App Store charges for IAP. More specifically, Apple does not
allow users of Apple Apps to purchase anything related to use within the app through another
purchasing method, consequently forcing developers of Apple Apps to pay a 30% commission to
Apple. On the same day that Epic Games filed suit against Apple, Epic Games filed an almost
identical suit against Google concerning its 30% commission rate on IAP.97 As the counts in
these two complaints are identical and concern the same aspects of law, this section addresses
them together.
Sherman Act
The Sherman Act was created with the intention of “preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade.”98 99 First passed in 1890, and most recently amended in 2004,
the Sherman Act is the first federal antitrust law.100 While the Act governs the operation of
businesses, it is intended to protect consumers by ensuring that the market remains competitive
and that businesses do not work together to manipulate the market to their advantage at the
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disadvantage of the consumers.101 More precisely, the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce,”
or any monopolization or attempt at monopolization of trade or commerce.102 Six of the counts in
the Complaint against Apple related to the Sherman Act: (1) unlawful monopoly maintenance in
the iOS app distribution market; (2) denial of an essential facility in the iOS app distribution
market; (3) unreasonable restraints of trade in the iOS app distribution market; (4) unlawful
monopoly maintenance in the iOS in-app payment processing market; (5) unreasonable restraints
of trade in the iOS in-app payment processing market; and (6) tying the App Store in the iOS app
distribution market to IAP in the iOS in-app payment processing market.103 Upon closer analysis
of these counts, there are essentially two issues at play: first, that Apple does not allow any sort
of IAP to occur that is not processed through Apple’s processing system, and second, that the
developer agreement with Apple unlawfully requires the developers to adhere to its requirements
for IAP, in-app payments, and any use of the Apple App Store.104 Whether the court views these
allegations as a violation of the Sherman Act is still up for debate. However, the argument for
both sides remains strong.
California's Cartwright Act and California's Unfair Competition Law
California's Cartwright Act105 and California's Unfair Competition Law106 are further
protections that the state of California has implemented to keep consumers safe. Some
distinctions can be made between these two state laws and the federal Sherman Act that will be
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addressed in the following paragraphs. Furthermore, it is important to note that while federal law
usually preempts most state law, in these instances there is a presumption against preemption.107
The presumption against preemption is in place to help protect the “established state role,” as
states are free to enact stricter and more rigorous laws than the minimum protections granted by
the federal government.108
The Cartwright Act has many similarities with the Sherman Act, such that federal
precedent is often used in the analysis of the Cartwright Act claims. 109 Federal precedent is
important in the analysis of these issues because the Cartwright Act is similar to §1 of the
Sherman Act as both prohibit unreasonable restraints on trade.110 However, federal precedent
related to §2 of the Sherman Act does not apply to any Cartwright Act analysis.111 This is
because the Cartwright Act does not prohibit monopolization.112 In California, state law claims
concerning monopolization must be brought under California's Unfair Competition Law, which
will be addressed later in this section. The Cartwright Act differs from federal precedent in four
ways: (1) the factors necessary to show standing; (2) the standing of indirect purchasers; (3) the
legality of minimum resale price maintenance; and (4) the elements of certain tying claims.113
Since the Cartwright Act can differ from the federal Sherman Act, plaintiffs should bring claims
under both laws.114
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While the Sherman Act generally prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade and
monopolization, the Cartwright Act differs by listing specific actions that are prohibited.115
These prohibitions are as follows: (1) restrain trade or commerce; (2) limit production or increase
prices; (3) prevent competition in the manufacturing, making, transportation, sale, or purchase of
merchandise, produce, or any commodity; (4) fix or control prices; and (5) enter into any
agreements regarding the transport or sale of any article or commodity to set price, amount,
united effort or any interest that may affect the price.116 To prove a Cartwright Act claim, three
elements must be satisfied: (1) formation and operation of a conspiracy, (2) illegal activity
conducted under the conspiracy, and (3) damages.117
California's Unfair Competition Law prohibits any business act or practice that is
“unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” or that is an “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading”
advertisement.118 California’s Unfair Competition Law also incorporates any act that is
prohibited by California’s false advertising law as stated in Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17500.119
California courts have extended the unfair competition law to protect against both anticompetitive business practices and injuries to consumers.120 This is important because violating
other laws can provide the necessary groundwork to bring a claim under California's Unfair
Competition Law. Even if the claim fails under the unfair competition law, it may still establish
unfair or fraudulent acts or practices.121
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The most famous California case concerning Califorina’s Unfair Competition Law is CelTech Commc'ns, Inc.122 In this case, the California Supreme Court established the test for an
unfair business act or practice is conduct that either violates antitrust law or policy or otherwise
has a significant adverse impact on competition.123 Cel-Tech has been held to apply in
commercial cases, but courts are still deliberating as to whether it can apply to cases concerning
consumers.124 Despite the prevalence of Cel-Tech, courts have established two other tests, the
balancing test and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Acts Test, for deciding whether there
is an unfair business act or practice in regards to consumers.125 Under the balancing test, courts
look to the conduct’s impact on the consumer and the alleged wrongdoer’s reasons,
justifications, and motives.126 The balancing test can be further simplified into whether the
practice or act circumvents an established public policy and is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”127 The balancing test has seemingly fallen
out of favor, even in the consumer context, and appears to have been replaced by the FTC Act
Test. Under the FTC Act Test, a court looks to whether the act or practice causes or is likely to
cause substantial injury to consumers, and the injury is both not reasonably avoidable by the
consumers and not outweighed by the benefits to consumers or competition.128 Overall, Cel-Tech
is the appropriate analysis for cases in the commercial context while the FTC Act Test is better
suited to consumer-based cases. However, regardless of which method is used, acts or practices
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that are expressly permitted by statute cannot be considered to be an unfair business practice or
act and cannot be considered to be a violation of the California Unfair Competition law.129
The Cartwright Act is “broader in range and deeper in reach than the Sherman Act” in
many regards, and with California's Unfair Competition Law, it provides more protection than
the Sherman Act.130 In Epic Games’ Complaint, three counts pertain to the California Cartwright
Act and one count relates to California’s Unfair Competition Law.131 The specific allegations
revolving around the Cartwright Act allege that there is anti-competitive conduct because the
“conduct of a single firm coerces other market participants to involuntarily adhere to the anticompetitive scheme” and that the digital market is a valid antitrust market because app
developers are forced “to submit to conditions that unreasonably restrain competition.”132
The Argument for Both Sides
It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with either an iPhone or an Android that
these devices do not allow their users options of where they download and purchase apps.133 The
operating systems of these devices are confidential and proprietary information that is the result
of years of effort and millions of dollars.134 The technological giants behind smartphones have
continued to upgrade their devices to generate profit.135 It is rational and makes good business
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sense that they do not want to allow a secondary market to gain access to their proprietary
information.136 However, it is this very refusal to allow for a secondary market or to permit a
workaround that has caused these present legal actions. What is most interesting about the Epic
Games’ actions is that both sides in these cases have compelling arguments. Apple and Google,
as the manufacturers of the smartphones and the creators of the operating systems, have a
compelling argument as to why they should be allowed to retain control of their digital
marketplaces. On the other hand, Epic Games and the others who have objections to how Apple
and Google run their digital marketplaces do have legitimate concerns that need to be addressed.
Epic Games is the most recent, and perhaps the most well-known, of the companies that
have sought to challenge the commission rates of digital marketplaces. Fortnite is well on the
path to becoming one of the most profitable and well-loved games of this generation.137 Not only
is the game free to download, which makes it more accessible, but it allows for cross-platform
play. This cross-platform play allows the game to be more universal and can even be considered
as an encouragement for the players to spend money as purchases made in the game on one
platform can now be used in the same game on other devices. Players previously hesitant to
spend money to get the same customization or benefits can now spend freely knowing that the
purchases will benefit their game play on all devices with that game. Gamers, despite their
reputation of being introverts, are quite sociable and love to be able to show off in game.138 The
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ability to purchase and customize the playable character is a huge attraction and incentive for
players to spend additional money on in-game purchases.139 Furthermore, the in-game purchases
make up the majority of Epic Game’s revenue for its’ smash hit Fortnite.140 Epic Games made a
conscious choice to allow its users to purchase V-Bucks for use on Apple and Android devices
directly through Fortnite. After all, this allows Epic Games to retain 100% of the profit and
maneuver around paying any commission on the IAP.
Why would Epic Games bother to file complaints against both Apple and Google - is all
this effort worth the payoff if they win? Since Fortnite’s release in 2017, the game quickly rose
to popularity and has been installed 133.2 million times in the Apple App Store and 11 million
times in the Google Play Store. Even more impressive is that Fortnite only joined the Google
Play Store in April 2020.141 That Fortnite has had over 11 million downloads on Android from
April 2020 to August 2020 is indicative of just how popular Fortnite is and continues to be. A
study by Sensor Tower estimated that Fortnite has generated around $1.2 billion in revenue from
the Apple IAP.142 According the developers’ commission, it is estimated that $360 million of
Fortnite’s revenue went to Apple.143 The commission rates for Android users on the Google Play
Store have resulted in $10 million in commission for Google, and this is no small number
considering that Fortnite has only been available on Google Play Store since April 2020.144
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You may be asking yourself, what exactly does Apple do that is deserving of a 30%
commission rate on all IAP? This is undoubtedly the question that Epic Games asked itself
before it launched its lawsuit. However, Apple does provide many useful services to its
developers including, but not limited to, assistance with the development of the apps and
assistance with billing. Apple does not design the game and operates more as a facilitator for the
app as it creates the devices on which the app will exist, the operating system on which the app
runs, and provides the necessary service of updating apps that have already been downloaded.145
These are essential services that allow the app to operate as intended.146 Furthermore, these
services are not free to operate as there is substantial work that must go into providing such
services.147 For example, Apple provides customer service assistance when there is a bug in a
program that causes a user to be charged wrongly for something that they did not purchase.
Without Apple providing customer service, informing the app developer of any issue within the
app would be time consuming and frustrating for the App user’s. Apple must pay for and provide
the customer service for the consumer to chat or call into, and Apple must implement the update
that resolves the issue onto all devices that contain the app.148 Granted, large companies like Epic
Games, who make their living off of developing and producing games, are capable of directly
providing these sorts of services to their consumers. But does this mean that they should be
exempt from the 30% commission rate just because they feel that they can better provide the
services Apple does for their consumers?
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Hot Off the Press! - What’s the Public Opinion?
Public opinion on the 30% commission rate and Apple’s treatment of those that oppose it
appears to be oscillating back and forth. The public seems to never take Apple’s side but never
quite takes Epic Games’ side either. Both sides are actively using their public platforms to sway
the popular opinion to their side. What has yet to be seen is whether these efforts will be
effective on the court and sway the judge or the federal authorities to step in further.
Epic Games has launched a page on its website dedicated to what they call
#FreeFortnite.149 Fortnite is advocating that players and fans use the hashtag on social media in
order to get people to join the fight “to end anti-competitive restrictions on mobile device
marketplaces by Apple and Google.”150 A search for #FreeFortnite on Twitter does show that it
is frequently used, but whether Apple or the courts will consider this social media advocacy to be
persuading cannot be known until the case is decided.151 Most importantly, the web page features
Epic Games’ public statements regarding the litigation, the original complaints against both
Apple and Google, and Epic Game’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Apple from
removing Fortnite from the Apple App Store.152 Epic Games is being very open and forward
with aspects of this litigation, likely in an effort to gain public sympathy and support.
Epic Games has even offered a frequently asked questions section specifically about the
litigation against Apple.153 The FAQ includes questions such as: “Why can’t I access Fortnite on
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iOS and Google Play?,” “I only play Fortnite on mobile devices. How can I regain access to
Fortnite if I only play on iOS devices or on Android via Google Play?,” and “ Why doesn’t Epic
capitulate to Apple and Google’s demand to remove Epic direct payment.”154 In its answers to
these questions, Apple’s 30% commission rate for all IAP is referred to by Epic Games as a
“30% tax.”155 Calling Apple’s 30% commission charge for IAP a “tax” will likely be persuasive
to those that are not familiar with the law or with how Apple’s commission charge actually
works. However. calling the 30% commission rate a tax is a clear misrepresentation of what the
charge is and how it is implemented. The 30% commission rate is not redirected to the
consumers and it cannot properly be considered a tax that the consumers pay as it only really
affects the bottom line of Epic Games. If Epic Games were to pass this commission rate onto the
consumers and raise the cost of its V-Bucks, then perhaps this would be considered a “tax” of
sorts for the consumers. However, if Epic Games were to try to implement this and raise the
price of V-Bucks it is likely that it’s sales would decrease. Interestingly, Epic Games has also
asserted that Apple and Google want to “punish game developers like [Epic Games] who offer
direct payment options.”156 Epic Games contends that it should be able to offer an alternative
option to its players where they can make these purchases and that it should be able to offer an
option to its consumers for them to purchase directly from Epic Games.157 To encourage players
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to directly purchase from Fortnite, Epic Games has instituted a discount of 20% for all purchases
made directly from Epic Games.158

Image from Epic Games website announcing the pricing discount on iOS devices.159

This 20% price discount that Epic Games attempted to offer to players on iOS and Android
devices is what resulted in Fortnite being removed from the digital marketplaces. Interestingly
enough, the 20% discount has become permanent on other platforms.160 The devices that are
eligible for this discount are PlayStation 4, Xbox One, Nintendo Switch, PC, Mac, and GeForce
NOW.161 Despite Google’s efforts to remove Fortnite from the Google Play Store, it appears that
there is still a viable way to download and play the game from Google Play Store. For users who
still wish to play Fortnite on their Android devices, there are two ways players may install the
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latest version of the Epic Games App for Android. 162 The two options include downloading the
game from Fortnite.com/Android or from the Samsung Galaxy Store.163
As of October 2020, Apple has yet to make any public comment on the lawsuit filed by
Epic Games. It is only the documents that Apple has filed with the court that can shed some light
on Apple’s opinion on the litigation as Apple has been fairly quiet on the matter outside of the
courtroom. Apple has not held back in its court documents filed against Epic Games about how it
feels about the current situation, making comments such as “Epic started a fire, and poured
gasoline on it, and now asks this Court for emergency assistance in putting it out,” 164 and
“Epic’s asserted harm is the self-inflicted and self-fixable result of its own cheating and
breach.”165 Most interestingly, Apple repeatedly refers to what it calls the “iPhone
Ecosystem.”166 Apple’s “iPhone ecosystem” is essentially the culmination of its operating
system, the iPhone hardware, and the resulting community that began to use Apple’s products
and develop their own applications for it.167 Apple seems almost incredulous that Epic Games
has brought this suit alleging that Apple participates in anti-competition acts and practices. Apple
contends that Epic Games “wants to keep enjoying these extensive, and expensive, benefits of
Apple’s ecosystem, including continued access to Apple’s iPhone customers—for free.”168 To
not pay the 30% commission to Apple for IAP, Epic Games activated hidden code within
Fortnite that allowed it to circumvent Apple’s in-app payment system.169 Apple is within its right
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to remove Fortnite from the App Store because Epic Games broke the developer agreement that
it made with Apple.170
Where Does This Case Currently Stand? Is Anyone Right?
As of October 9, 2020, the judge in the Epic Games v. Apple Inc. case ruled on the
motion for preliminary injunction and held that Apple does not have to put Fortnite back into the
Apple App Store.171 While this may seem like an initial victory for Apple, the judge ruled that
Apple may not ban the Unreal Engine from the App Store.172 This is likely due to a large number
of users of Unreal Engine whose apps and businesses do not relate to the pending litigation.173
Appearing to take advantage of the present movement, those who have had objections to
Apple’s developer policies and mandatory commission rates have created the Coalition for App
Fairness.174 Among the group’s founders are familiar names such as Epic Games, Spotify, Match
Group, and Tile.175 This collation has labeled itself as an “independent nonprofit organization
founded by industry-leading companies to advocate for freedom of choice and fair competition
across the app ecosystem.”176 The coalition has targeted Apple as the principal offender of anticompetitive policies, and contends that Apple is displaying “monopolist behavior” by
“controlling the products and features that are available to consumers.”177 The site provides two
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examples of Apple’s behavior concerning Tile and Kindle.178 The second issue the coalition
picks with Apple is the 30% commission rate on IAP.179 The coalition references that when the
30% commission rate was implemented in 2011 many businesses were no longer able to make a
profit and went out of business and that Steve Jobs, in an internal email, told other Apple
executives that “Bottom line — we didn’t have a policy and now we do, and there will be some
roadkill because of it. I don’t feel guilty.”180
Spotify Investigation
On March 11, 2019, Spotify filed a complaint with the European Commission who have
announced that it will be conducting a formal investigation into the matter.181 The complaints
Spotify raises are closely related to those of Epic Games as both object to the 30% commission
rate and Apple’s other anti-competitive policies.182 The European Commission will be
investigating Apple's App Store practices and how such “practices may ultimately harm
consumers by preventing them from benefiting from greater choice and lower prices.”183 Not
much is formally known about this investigation. Spotify has created a website called “Time to
Play Fair” where it advocates for its case against Apple and has answered common questions
about the investigation.184 Most offensive to Spotify appears to be Apple’s favoring of Apple
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Music App over competitors’ apps, as Spotify argues that this creates an unfair playing field and
does not allow the companies to compete on merit alone.185 Spotify has allowed the European
Commission to champion them and take over their fight to make the digital marketplaces fair and
equal to the developers who use them.
Conclusion
The litigation between Apple and the app developers is likely only to have begun. The
Epic Games litigation has brought the debate over anti-competitive restrictions in the digital
marketplaces to the forefront of our news and our minds. The digital marketplace on these
devices has no federal regulations, and soon the federal government, most likely the Department
of Justice, will have to address the issues concerning whether Apple and other smartphone
manufacturers are participating in anti-competitive behavior. Even if the litigation filed by Epic
Games is resolved in Apple’s favor, it is likely to be only the first case of the sort in the United
States. The approach that the European Union is taking with investigating Apple’s practices in
Europe will likely soon be mirrored here in the United States as valid concerns about Apple and
Google’s treatment of their respective digital markets have been raised and can no longer be
ignored.
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